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HAZARDOUS WASTES AND STRICT LIABILITY: A CASE
FOR HOLDING THE PRODUCERS OF HAZARDOUS
WASTES RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION - THE PROBLEM OF HAZARDOUS
WASTES
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA)1 is one of the major pieces of federal legislation dealing
with hazardous wastes. 2 The RCRA defines hazardous waste as
any solid waste or combination of solid wastes that may "cause, or
significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or ... pose
a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or
disposed of, or otherwise managed. ' 3 Solid wastes may include
garbage, refuse, sludge and other discarded material, including
solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations
or from community activities, 4
1. 42 U.S.C. §5 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Other major legislative efforts dealing with
hazardous wastes are the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §5 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 55 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)
and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Xc, IU.S.C. 551801-1812 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. The objectives of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
55 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), are to promote the protection of health and the environment
and to conserve valuable resources by "regulating the treatment, storage, transportation, and
disposal of hazardous wastes which have adverse effects on health and the environment." Id.
56902(4).
3. Id. § 6903(5). The deleterious potential of such wastes is measured in terms of their quantity
and concentration of physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics. Id.
4. Id. § 6903(27). Solid waste, however, does not include the following: Solid or dissolved
material in domestic sewage; solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows; industrial
discharges that are point sources under § 1342 of Title 33; and special nuclear or nuclear byproduct
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Hazardous waste is more succinctly defined as any waste
posing a present or potential hazard to human health because of
toxicity, nondegradability, persistence in nature, or susceptibility
to biological magnification. 5 Regardless of definition, however,
modern American industrial society continues to produce and
discard hazardous materials at an alarming rate.
6
This Note examines the issue of liability for generators of
hazardous wastes who either legally or illicitly, through the
dumping practices of low-bid contract haulers, dispose of waste
products. 7 When disposal of hazardous waste products results in
potentially severe environmental harm, society should assure itself
that the entitites producing these hazardous wastes dispense with
them properly and that enterprises involving unusual hazards pay
their own way. 8 This Note will discuss the generation of hazardous
wastes as an abnormally dangerous 9  undertaking. This
undertaking, when coupled with appropriate notions of enterprise
liability, is sufficient to hold hazardous waste producers strictly
liable for any resulting harms.
II. ESTABLISHING A BASIS FOR HOLDING OFF-SITE
GENERATORS OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
STRICTLY LIABLE FOR SUBSEQUENT HARM
A. STRICT LIABILITY IN THE USE OF LAND
The first case to consider in depth the issue of liability without
fault as applied to the use of land was Rylands v. Fletcher. '0 In Rylands
v. Fletcher the defendants constructed a reservoir on their own land
to collect water. This particular land was located in coal mining
country and the new reservoir was built above the shaft of an
material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Id.
5. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS
WASrES 83, 87 app. (1974).
6. F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 9.09, at 325 (1981). Professor Skillern warns that
while wastes are being generated in increasing quantities, on-site disposal facilities are being used to
their full capacity and many state sites are overused or unsuitable. Id.
7. The unfortunate consequences of such practices are duly recorded and include thousands of
pollution incidents. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 690 (1977). Specific incidents include
improper arsenic disposal, cyanide and phenol disposal, poisoning of local water supply, unidentified
toxic wastes, and ocean dumping of chemical waste. Id.
8. Department ofTransp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 NJ. Super. 447, 463, 419 A.2d 1151,
1159 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980). PSC Resources involved the alleged pollution of a lake. Id. at 447,
419 A.2d at 1151.
9. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[flor an activity to be abnormally dangerous,
not only must it create a danger of physical harm to others but the danger must be an abnormal
one." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment f(1977).




abandoned coal mine. When the reservoir was partially filled with
water, the shaft gave way and water broke into the abandoned
mine. The water flowed into the plaintiff's mine and caused
damage.11
The Court of Exchequer rendered judgment for the
defendants but the Court of Exchequer Chamber subsequently
reversed the decision. 12 Lord Cairns acknowledged the controlling
rule of law, stated by Mr. Justice Blackburn in the Court of
Exchequer Chamber, that a person who brings onto his own land
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, does so at his own
peril.13 The court, however, limited this rule by stating that the
principle of strict liability applied only to a nonnatural use of the
defendants' land. 14 The court's emphasis, therefore, shifted to the
abnormal and inappropriate character of the defendants' reservoir
in coal mining country rather than the mere tendency of water to
escape from confinement. 15
The English decisions following Rylands v. Fletcher shaped the
category of "nonnatural uses" to include uses of land deemed
inappropriate or unusual and dangerous in the particular location
and surroundings. 16  The strict liability found in British
jurisdictions is frequently confined to activities that are
"extraordinary," "exceptional," or "abnormal.' 7  Thus, a
11. Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 740 (Ex. 1865) rev'd, 1 L.R. 265, 268 (Ex. Ch.
1866), aff'd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 332 (H.L. 1868).
12.3 L.R.-E. &I. App. at 330.
13. Id. at 339-40. Lord Cairns, quoting Mr.Justice Blackburn, stated:
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings
on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is primafacie answerable for all the
damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by
shewing that the escape was owing to the Plaintiff's default; or, perhaps, that the
escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God: but as nothing of this sort
exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.
Id.
14. Id. at 338. Lord Cairns noted:
The Defendants, treating them as the owners or occupiers of the close on which the
reservoir was constructed, might lawfully have used that close for any purpose for
which it might in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used; and if... there
had been any accumulation of water, either on the surface or underground, and if...
that accumulation of water had passed off into the close occupied by the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiff could not have complained .... [But] if the Defendants, not stopping at the
natural use of their close, had desired to use it for ... a non-natural use, for the
purpose of introducing into the close that which in its natural condition was not in or
upon it. . . and if in consequence of their doing so ... the water came to escape...
[then] that which the Defendants were doing they were doing at their own peril....
Id. at 338-39.
15. Id. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 5 78, at 505-06 (4th ed. 1971).
16. Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 587, 643
(1969).
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 506.
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special use involving increased danger to others must exist. This
special use must not be merely an ordinary use of land or a type of
use proper for the general benefit of the community.18 The
principle emerging from the English decisions as the rule of Rylands
v. Fletcher is that the defendant will be liable when he damages
another by an activity that is unduly dangerous and inappropriate
to the place where it is maintained, in the light of the charactcr of
that place and its surroundings. 19
American jurisdictions follow this view. 20 In the United States
today, however, the tenet of Rylands v. Fletcher, although still
retaining some distinctiveness,2 1 has been substantially absorbed
into a larger concept of "extrahazardous," "ultrahazardous," and
"abnormally dangerous" activities. 22
The American Law Institute addressed "abnormally
dangerous activities" in two sections of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. 23 Section 520 of the Restatement lists six factors
considered in determining whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous. One of these factors is the "inappropriateness of the
18. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 506. See Wirth v. Mayrath Indus., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 789
(N.D. 1979). The court ixn Wirth held that the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
dealing with the imposition of strict liability on those engaged in abnormally dangerous activities did
not apply to an electric company, which maintained an uninsulated high voltage power line. The
court noted that electrical power is necessary to the well-being of the country and is becoming more
important as other sources of energy become scarce. Id. at 794.
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 508. See Sachs v. Chiat, 281 Minn. 540, 162 N.W.2d 243
(1968). Sachs was an action against a landowner and housing contractor for damages and an
injunction. Id. Damage to the plaintiff's land resulted from pile driver concussions and from water
drainage from the defendant's lot onto plaintiffs lot. Id. at 544, 162 N.W.2d at 246. The court noted
that pile driving inevitably transmits concussions to adjacent areas regardless of the reasonable
precaution with which it is conducted. Pile driving is, therefore, an ultrahazardous activity. Id. The
court held that it is the kind of activity that should not be permitted without liability for substantial
property damage resulting from its performance. Id. See also Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach
Constr. Co., 291 Minn. 429, 436, 194 N.W.2d 767, 772 (1971).
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 509-12. See, e.g., Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. Tyler,
482 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1973) (collapse of a dam during a heavy rainstorm). The court in Tyler noted
that the American view has reached the position that the rule is applied "only to the thing out of
place, the abnormally dangerous condition or activity which is not a 'natural' one where it is." Id. at
1009 (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 512 (4th ed. 1971)).
21. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 511-12. The American cases apply the principle of Rylands
solely to the thing that is out of place. Id.
22. See Katz, supra note 16, at 643. The first term used was "extrahazardous." This term was
superseded by "ultrahazardous," which in turn gave way to "abnormally dangerous." Id. n.143.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977). Section 519 states:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he
has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
Id. § 519. Section 520 states:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are
to be considered:




activity to the place where it is carried on.' '24 The inclusion of this
factor signifies acceptance of the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher.
American cases considering instances of abnormally dangerous
activities place as much stress upon the place where the activity is
conducted as the English cases.
25
Courts predicate liability for abnormally dangerous activities
on the policy that anyone who, for his own purposes, creates an
abnormal risk should bear the costs of damage when the risk is
realized. 26 By extending the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, a case
may be made for imposing strict liability on the entrepreneur who
brings hazardous wastes onto his own land. 27 One further step is
necessary to extend liability to generators 28 of hazardous wastes.
This second step applies the concept of "abnormally dangerous
activities. ''29
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
() extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Id. § 520.
24. Id. § 520(e).
25. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 512. See Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659 (7th
Cir. 1975). In Mowrer the court found that a waterflood operation designed to force oil out of a well
was an "abnormally dangerous activity." Id. at 662. This activity would render the defendant oil
company strictly liable for damages sustained by adjacent property owners had they pursued that
theory. Id. The court stated that "[t]he waterflood, an artificial and intentional invasion of plaintiff's
property conducted as a part of a business, introduced a risk of serious harm to the land of others
which could not be eliminated by the exercise of care and was not a matter of common usage." Id.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 519 comment d (1977). Comment d affirms the principle
that liability arises out of the abnormal danger of the activity itself and the risk that it creates to those
in its vicinity. Comment d states the policy reason for the principle as follows:
It is founded upon a policy of the law that imposes upon anyone who for his own
purposes creates an abnormal risk of harm to his neighbors, the responsibility of
relieving against that harm when it does in fact occur. The defendant's enterprise, in
other words, is required to pay its way by compensating for the harm it causes,
because of its special, abnormal and dangerous character.
Id.
27. See Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In Cities Service the
court held that the doctrine of strict liability for damage resulting from a nonnatural use of land
applies in Florida. Id. at 801. The court found that a leak in a phosphate slime reservoir operated by
Cities Service Co. constituted a nonnatural use of land. Therefore, the court applied the doctrine of
strict liability. Id. at 803-04.
28. The term "generator" in this Note signifies the originating source or producing entity
responsible for the hazardous wastes. The term "entrepreneur," or some similar identifier, refers to
others in the chain of possession of waste products distinct from generators.
29. The concept of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities is fortified by merging this
concept with the analogous concept of enterprise liability. Enterprise liability is predicated on the
notion that those who conduct an activity involving unusual hazards must pay for damage resulting
from the activity. See Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Ball v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 519 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1975). Hall involved 18
separate accidents in which children were injured by blasting caps. The District Court noted that
"it]he allegations in this case suggest that the entire blasting cap industry and its trade association
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B. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AS A NECESSARY ADJUNCT
The Restatement (Second) of Torts declares that imposing
strict liability involves "a characterization of the defendant's
activity or enterprise itself, and a decision as to whether he is free to
conduct it at all without becoming subject to liability for the harm
that ensues even though he has used all reasonable care." ' 30 The
reasoning behind this standard is that when a person suffers a loss,
no good reason exists to charge the loss against anyone who did not
contribute to it.31 Perhaps the New Jersey32 Supreme Court best
expressed this view when it declared that "[w]e are here primarily
concerned with the underlying considerations of reasonableness,
fairness and morality rather than with the formulary labels to be
attached to the plaintiffs' causes of action or the legalistic
classifications in which they are to be placed." 
33
An examination of Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. v. Toti
Contracting Co. 3 4 is helpful in understanding the rationale behind the
evolving notion of strict enterprise liability. Majestic Realty affirms
the principle that the social value of a duty to the community may
be so significant that the law cannot allow it to be tansferred to
another.3 5 The court stated that "in the resolution of the conflicting
interests of the innocent injured person and the landowner who
chose the contractor, justice and equity demand recognition of [an]
absolute duty. "36
provide the logical locus at which precautions should be taken and liability imposed." 345 F. Supp.
at 378.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 520 comment 1(1977).
31. G. ARBUCKLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 20 (6th rev. ed. 1979). See Aretz v. United
States, 604 F.2d 417, 433 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rubin, J., dissenting). In his dissentJustice Rubin notes
that it is appropriate for courts to consider the means to distribute risks of injury among all of society
instead of allowing the adverse consequences to fall only on "a luckless few." Id. at 437. See generally
C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 232-37 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing the policy analysis of enterprise
liability without fault).
32. New Jersey is a state particularly beset by environmental woes brought on by
industrialization. See generally Goldshore, Trends in Environmental Litigation: A Survey of 1976 New Jersy
Judicial Decisions, 9 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 21, 22 (1977) (because New Jersey has been a leader in the
environmental protection movement, its courts have faced a variety of environmental conflicts and
issues). See also Note, The Regulation of Hazardous Waste Disposal. Cleaning up the Augean Stables with a
Flood of Regulations, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 906 (1980). The student author notes that New Jersey, one
of the major industrial states, has a disproportionate share of hazardous waste treatment and
disposal problems. The EPA estimates that New Jersey generates more hazardous industrial waste
than any other state - 4.6 million metric tons of chemical hazardous wastes yearly, or about eight
percent of the total annual national production. Id. at 913.
33. Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 37 N.J. 396, 405, 181 A.2d 487, 492 (1962). In Berg the court
conceded that the testing of a rocket engine may be classified as ultrahazardous. Id. at 410, 181 A.2d
at 494.
34. 30 N.J. 425, 153 A.2d 321 (1959). Majestic Realty involved an action brought against a city
parking authority for damages resulting when a wall, which the city's independent contractor was
demolishing, collapsed onto the roof of the plaintiff's adjoining building. Majestic Realty Assoc. v.
Toti Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425, 429, 153 A.2d 321 (1959).
35. See id. at 438. 153 A.2d at 328.
36. Id. at 439, 153 A.2d at 328. See Fettig v. Whitman, 285 N.W.2d 517 (N.D. 1979). In Fettig
property owners brought a negligence action against a general contractor and others for damages
arising from one owner's fall through a stairwell. Id. The court acknowledged the existence of
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Furthermore, the court in Majestic Realty expressed the general
rule that no liability attaches to an employer who delegates a task to
a subcontractor. 37  The court, however, noted that certain
exceptions exist based upon public policy considerations. 38 The
three primarily recognized exceptions include the situation where
the contracted activity constitutes a nuisance per se. 39 Dean Prosser
notes that no American case applying Rylands v. Fletcher probably
exists that is not duplicated in all essential respects by another
American decision proceeding on a theory of nuisance.40  Under
that name the principle is universally accepted. 41 Regardless of the
label chosen, Prosser further observes that "[i]t is difficult to
suggest any criterion by which the non-delegable character of such
duties may be determined, other than the conclusion of the courts
that the responsibility is so important to the community that the
employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another." ' 42
Stated somewhat differently, the source of exceptions to the general
rule lies in situations in which the law views a duty as so important
and so peremptory that it will be treated as nondelegable.
43
C. EFFECT OF THE MERGER OF STRICT LIABILITY WITH CON-
CEPTS OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY WHEN ENGAGING IN
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES.
The rule of Fletcher v. Rylands, as incorporated in the
significant policy considerations in the employment of independent contractors. The employer
selects the contractor and is free to choose a responsible party. The employer also has
indemnification rights against an actively negligent contractor. Id. at 523. Furthermore, it is
arguable that the insurance necessary to distribute the risk is properly a cost of the employer's
business. Id. Additionally, the court questioned whether an employer may insulate himself from
liability for the negligent performance of his project by the mere manner in which he contracts for his
labor. Id.
37. Majestic Realty Assoc., 30 N.J. at 430-31, 153 A.2d at 324.
38. Id. at 431, 153 A.2d at 324. The court noted in a later passage:
Inevitably the mind turns to the fact that the injured party is entirely innocent and that
the occasion for his injury arises out of the desire of the contractee to have certain
activities performed. The injured has no control over or relation with the contractor.
The contractee, true, has no control over the doing of the work and in that sense is also
innocent of the wrongdoing; but he does have the power of selection and in the
application of concepts of distributive justice perhaps much can be said for the view
that a loss arising out of the tortious conduct of a financially irresponsible contractor
should fall on the contractee.
Id. at 432, 153 A.2d at 324-25.
39. Id. at 431, 153 A.2d at 324. The court acknowledged the following three exceptions to the
rule: (a) when a landowner retains control of the manner and means of doing the work, (b) when a
landowner engages an incompetent contractor, or (c) when the activity contracted for constitutes a
nuisance per se. Id.
40. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 513.
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 513.
42. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 471.
43. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.11, at 1406 (1956). The authors state that
defendants under a nondelegable duty cannot avoid this duty by hiring a contractor. Id. (citing
Hardaker v. Idle Dist. Council, 1 Q.B. 335, 340 (C.A. 1896)).
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44 when merged with the concept of
enterprise liability supplies a basis for holding the generators of
hazardous wastes liable for damage resulting from the disposal of
their products. 45 Section 520 comment I states that "[w]hether the
activity is an abnormally dangerous one is to be determined by the
court.' '46 Additionally, the section 520 strict liability rule is applied
even if the questioned activity is conducted away from the
defendant's premises. 47 Therefore, because the production and
transportation of hazardous wastes may be an "abnormally
dangerous" or "ultrahazardous" activity, the strict liability
provisions should apply to the problem of hazardous wastes. A
remaining point to consider is the question of possible federal
statutory preemption.
48
D. THE QUESTION OF PREEMPTION
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
declares, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . . ,49 As mentioned
previously, the chief law governing hazardous wastes is the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).5 0 A
major objective 51  of the RCRA is regulating the "treatment,
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977) (acknowledging inappropriateness of
the place where the activity is conducted as a factor in determining whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous). For the text of §§ 519, 520, seesupra note 23.
45. Hazardous wastes may be considered so deleterious to man and the environment that their
disposal is always inappropriate under any but ideal conditions. Furthermore, hazardous waste
production is so dangerous that producers must bear the burden of any damage caused by this
production. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment 1(1977).
47. Id. § 520 comment e. Comment e states:
In most of the cases to which the rule of strict liability is applicable the abnormally
dangerous activity is conducted on land in the possession of the defendant. This,
again, is not necessary to the existence of such an activity. It may be carried on in a
public highway or other public place or upon the land of another.
Id.
48. Congressional intent to preempt the area of hazardous waste legislation may be evinced in
three ways. See Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
469 (1982). Federal law will preempt state law in the following situations: When a statute expressly
declares that federal authority over a subject is exclusive; when federal preemption can be inferred
from the language or legislative history of a statute; or when federal and state law conflict. 677 F.2d
at 579. See also Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aft'd, 405
U.S. 1035 (1972) (federal government has exclusive authority under doctrine of preemption to
regulate construction and operation of nuclear power plants).
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1976) (listing objectives of the RCRA).
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storage, transportation, and disposal of hazardous wastes which
have adverse effects on health and the environment. "52 Because
hazardous wastes have adverse effects on health and the
environment, 53 the preemption issue is whether the RCRA
expressly limits available sanctions for violations to the criminal
penalties set out in the statute.
5 4
The act provides that a citizen may bring a law suit to enforce
the regulations and orders that are issued under the RCRA.
55
Furthermore, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) may bring suit in cases involving an imminent
hazard.5 6 None of these provisions delineate any public right to
seek civil damages or other relief from violators. Section 6972(0,
however, preserves in the citizenry the common law right to seek
52.42 U.S.C. § 6902(4) (1976).
53. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DISPOSAL OF
HAZARDOUS WASTES 8 (1974). This report notes serious adverse physiological effects, such as cancers
and birth defects, and also mentions other milder effects such as headaches, nausea, and indigestion.
Fishkills, reduced shellfish production, or improper eggshell synthesis manifest the effects of
hazardous wastes in the environment. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 6928(d) provides:
Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports any hazardous waste identified or listed under this
subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit under section 6925 of this title (or
section 6926 of this title in case of a State program), or pursuant to title I of the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052) [33 U.S.C. 1411 et seq.],
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed
under this subchapter either-
(A) without having obtained a permit under section 6925 of this title (or
section 6926 of this title in the case of a State program) or pursuant to title I of
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052) [33
U.S.C. 1411 et seq.]; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such
permit;
(3) knowingly makes any false material statement or representation in any
application, label, manifest, record, report, permit or other document filed,
maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with this subchapter; or
(4) knowingly generates, stores, treats, transports, disposes of, or otherwise
handles any hazardous waste (whether such activity took place before or takes place
after October 21, 1980) and who knowingly destroys, alters, or conceals any record
required to be maintained under regulations promulgated by the Administrator under
this subchapter shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $25,000
($50,000 in the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or (2)) for each day of violation, or
to imprisonment not to exceed one year (two years in the case of a violation of
paragraph (1) or (2)), or both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first
conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not
more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than two
years, or by both.
Id. 55. Id. § 6972(a). Any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf against any person,
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment, or against the EPA Administrator when an alleged failure of
the Administrator to perform any nondiscretionary act or duty exists. Id.
56. Id. § 6973. The Administrator of the EPA may bring suit on behalf of the United States in
the appropriate district court to immediately restrain an imminent and substantial hazardous waste
endangerment to health or the environment, or to take other action that may be necessary. Id. The
Administrator shall also notify the affected state of any such suit. Id.
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enforcement of any hazardous waste requirement or any other
relief deemed necessary. 57 The broad language of this section
evinces an unambiguous congressional intent to leave the area of
hazardous waste management free of preemption. 58  Citizens,
therefore, may bring suit against any violator and demand
appropriate relief. The theory of strict liability for the abnormally
dangerous activity of hazardous waste generation and subsequent
disposal, combined with notions of enterprise liability, provides a
common law basis upon which to institute such actions.
E. STATUTORY STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO GENERATORS OF
HAZARDOUS WASTES
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) rules establish
broad standards applicable to generators of hazardous waste.5 9 A
person who generates a hazardous waste is subject to the non-
compliance penalties of the RCRA if he does not comply with the
EPA requirements. 60 Moreover, an owner or operator who ships
hazardous waste must comply with the EPA standards. ,61 Under
part 262 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) a generator
must obtain proper EPA identification numbers. 62  Also, a
generator must not offer hazardous waste to transporters or
facilities that have not themselves received an EPA identification
number. 63  Any generator who transports, or offers for
57. Id. § 6972(0. Section 6972(f) states in part:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons)
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or
requirement relating to the management of solid waste or hazardous waste, or to seek
any other relief(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).
Id.
58. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (general federal question jurisdiction supports
a federal common law of interstate pollution). One commentator has noted that "[application of the
federal common law in the future requires the courts to be alert to whether Congress has made a clear
choice in confining the range of available remedies." W. RODGERS, supra note 7, § 2.12, at 154.
Section 6972(f) indicates that Congress made the choice in favor of broad relief when it is necessary.
42 U.S.C. § 6972(0 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
59. See 40 C.F.R. § 262.10 (1982). Generators may include the following: Persons who treat,
store, or dispose of hazardous wastes on-site; persons who import hazardous wastes into the United
States; farmers; owners or operators who initiate hazardous waste shipments from treatment,
storage, or disposal facilities; and persons who generate hazardous wastes as defined by 40 C.F.R.
pt. 261 (1982). Id.
60. Id. § 262.10(e). Generators of hazardous wastes as defined in § 261.3 are subject to the
federal enforcement provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 6928 if they fail to comply with the requirements of
Part 262 of the C.F.R. Id. For text of§ 6928(d), see supra note 54.
61. Id. § 262.10(0. The regulation states that "[a]n owner or operator who initiates a shipment
of hazardous waste from a treatment, storage, or disposal facility must comply with the generator
standards established in this Part." Id.




transportation, hazardous waste for off-site treatment, storage, or
disposal must prepare a manifest. 64 The manifest must contain the
following information: A document number; the generator's
name, mailing address, telephone number and EPA identification
number; the name and EPA identification number of each
transporter; the name, address, and EPA identification number of
the designated destination and any alternate; a description of the
hazardous waste involved; and the total quantity of hazardous
waste and the type and number of containers loaded onto the
transport vehicle.
65
The generator must designate on the manifest a primary
facility and may designate an alternate emergency facility
permitted to handle the waste. 66 If the transporter is unable to
deliver the hazardous waste to either facility, the generator either
must designate another facility or instruct the transporter to return
the waste. 67 There must be at least enough copies of the manifest to
supply the generator, each transporter, and the owner or operator
of the designated facility with one copy each for their records and
another copy to be returned to the generator. 68 Section 262.23 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) details the dispersal of
manifest copies through the chain of possession of the hazardous
materials. 69 Prior to transportation, the generator must comply
with certain packaging, 70 labeling, 71 marking,
72 and placarding 73
64. Id. 5 262.20(a).
65. Id. § 262.21(a). Section 262.21(a) requires that the following certification appear on the
manifest: "This is to certify that the above named materials are properly classified, described,
packaged, marked, and labeled and are in proper condition for transportation according to the
applicable regulations of the Department of Transportation and the EPA." Id.
66. Id. 5 262.20(b), (c).
67. Id. S 262.20(d).
68. Id. 5 262.22.
69. See id. 5 262.23. Section 262.23 requires that the generator sign the manifest certification by
hand, obtain the handwritten signature of the first transporter and the date of acceptance on the
manifest, and retain one copy. The generator must give the transporter the remaining copies of the
manifest. I&! The section lists further manifest requirements relating to bulk shipments by water and
rail shipments of hazardous wastes. Id.
Sections 263.20(e) and (f) include special provisions for rail or water transporters. See id.
5263.20 (1982).
70. See id. § 262.30. A generator must package hazardous waste according to the applicable
Department ofTransportation regulations on packaging under 49 C.F.R. pts. 173, 178, and 179. Id.
71. See id. § 262.31. A generator must label each package according to the applicable
Department of Transportation regulations on hazardous materials under 49 C.F.R. pt. 172. Id.
72. See id. § 262.32. A generator must mark each package of hazardous waste according to the
applicable Department of Transportation regulations on hazardous materials under 49 C.F.R. pt.
172. Id. § 262.32(a). A generator must mark each container of 110 gallons or less used in off-site
transportation of hazardous waste with the following words and information: "HAZARDOUS
WASTE - Federal Law Prohibits Improper Disposal. If found, contact the nearest police or public
safety authority or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Generator's Name and Address
__ Manifest Document Number_ ." Id. § 262.32(b).
73. See id. § 262.33. Section 262.33 provides that "[a] generator must placard or offer the initial
transporter the appropriate placards according to Department of Transportation regulations for
hazardous materials under 49 C.F.R. Part 172, Subpart F." Id.
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requirements.
The final set of duties required of the generator relate to
recordkeeping and reporting. 74 Section 262.40 of the CFR, the
main recordkeeping section, outlines the mandatory recordation
duties for all generators. 75 Specific sections concerning annual
reporting, 76 exception reporting, 77 and additional reporting
78
follow section 262.40. Finally, the regulations include sections
dealing with special conditions pertaining to international
shipments79 and farmers. 80 The transporters must also comply with
the manifest system at their end of the transaction. 8'
These duties are substantial steps toward responsible cradle-
to-grave management of hazardous wastes. Yet circumstances
abound when the system can be flouted. For example, one problem
is determining whether the waste to be disposed is a hazardous
waste. Part 261 of the CFR identifies and lists hazardous wastes.
82
These regulations specifically define which substances constitute
hazardous waste83  and which substances do not constitute
hazardous wastes. 84  Section 261.33 lists specific hazardous
wastes. 5 Problems arise when a hazardous waste not on the list
appears in a place where it can cause damage. This situation, as
well as the related problem of widespread collusion among waste
producers, is addressed briefly below. Several cases considering
what constitues an abnormally dangerous activity are also
presented.
74. Id. §§ 262.40 - 263.20.
75. See id. § 262.40. This section requires a generator to retain a copy of each manifest signed in
accordance with § 262.23 for three years or until he receives a signed copy from the designated
facility that received the waste. The signed copy must also be kept as a record for at least three years
from the date the initial transporter accepted the waste. Id. Provision is similarly made for retention
of annual reports, exception reports, test results, waste analyses, and other determinations. See id.
The time periods referred to in the section are automatically extended during the course of any
unresolved enforcement action regarding the regulated activity or as requested by the Administrator.
Id.
76. See id. § 262.41.
77. See id. § 262.42.
78. See id. § 262.43.
79. See id. § 262.50.
80. See id. § 262.51.
81. Id. § 263.20. Transporters must maintain records of all transactions. Detailed requirements
are prescribed for transporters who accept hazardous wastes at the generator's premises, deliver
hazardous wastes to another transporter or to the designated facility, and who transport hazardous
wastes out of the United States. See id.
82. See id. §§261.1 to .33.
83. See id. 5 261.3. A solid waste is a hazardous waste if it is not excluded under 5 261.4(b) and it
meets any of a large list ofcriteria. Id. 5 261.3. See id. 5 261.11 (criteria for listing hazardous wastes).
84. See id. 5 261.4(b). A long list of solid wastes have been statutorily declared to be non-
hazardous. Examples of such solid wastes are wastes generated by the growing and harvesting of
agricultural crops and wastes that are returned to the soil as fertilizers. Id. 5 261.4(b)(2).
85. See id. 55 261.30 to .33. Unless excluded under 55 260.20 and 260.22, a solid waste listed




A. ASHLAND OIL, INC. V. MILLER OIL PURCHASING Co.
8 6
In a recent case Ashland Oil, Incorporated (Ashland Oil)
sought damages from several defendants and third party
defendants for a fire and explosion at its Kentucky refinery and the
contamination of approximately two million barrels of crude oil.81
In Ashland Oil the court found a series of events and transactions
that led to the injection of hazardous chemical waste products into
Ashland's crude oil pipeline caused the damages. 88 Although the
prime mover behind the tortious activity was a waste disposal
facility and not a hazardous waste generator,8 9 the case is
nonetheless important and instructive. 90  A rather lengthy
discussion of the facts underlying the case is necessary because of its
complexity.
Rollins Environmental Services, Incorporated (Rollins)
accepted numerous waste materials from the oil and chemical
plants in its business area. 91 Rollins contracted with E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Company (DuPont) to dispose of chemical waste
products. 92 Among these waste products were certain chemical
substances, identified as dichlorobutadiene, containing heavy
concentrations of organic chlorides. 93 The EPA listed neither of
these substances, identified by the symbols BR50 and BR68, as a
hazardous waste. 94
Pursuant to its agreement with DuPont, Rollins intended to
incinerate the hazardous wastes. This intent, however, was
frustrated when corrosion caused by the substances rendered the
86.678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1982).
87. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293, 1296 (5th Cir. 1982).
88. Id. at 1296.
89. Id. at 1297-1303. The chief defendant in Ashland Oil represented itself "as an expert in the
handling and disposal ofchemical waste." Id. at 1298.
90. Id. at 1293. Ashland Oil is instructive because it provides insight into the problems of
identifying hazardous wastes and the complexity of hazardous waste transactions. The facts of
Ashland Oil show that not all hazardous wastes appear on the EPA lists and, thus, are not subject to
regulation under the RCRA. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-261.33 (1982) (lists of hazardous wastes). The
facts also show that industries sometimes do conspire to operate outside the law. See 678 F.2d at 1279-
1303. Furthermore, Ashland Oil advances the theory of liability that is the theme of this Note: each
defendant is liable under a theory of strict liability predicated upon involvement in an abnormally
dangerous activity. Id. at 1308.
91. 678 F.2d at 1298. The Rollins facility was located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Id.
92. Id. A DuPont engineer informed Rollins of the chemical components and propensities of the
waste. The engineer also warned Rollins that the chemicals were corrosive and should be disposed of
by incineration. Id.
93. Id. at 1297. The court described the chemical substances involved as "toxic and harmful to
persons on touch or inhalation, corrosive to metals and other materials, noxiously malodorous, and
pollutants of ground and surface water and plant and animal life." Id. The substances do not appear
on the EPA's lists of hazardous wastes. See 40 C.F.R. 55 261.30-261.33 (lists of hazardous wastes).
94. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.11 (1982) (criteria for listing hazardous wastes).
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incinerator inoperative. 95 Faced with an increasing amount of the
waste on its premises, Rollins entered into an agreement with an
independent contractor, Larry Young, 96 whereby Young would
take the BR50 and BR68 from Rollins, despite Rollins' knowledge
that the chemical substances were dangerous. Rollins was aware
that the agreement would cause it to breach its contract with
DuPont.9 7 Therefore, Rollins took various precautions to avoid the
possibility that anyone might trace the BR50 and BR68 to its
facilities.98
Incredibly, the intrigue continued when Young, through his
company, Alan Petroleum, Incorporated, entered into an
agreement with Waco, Incorporated (Waco), a small oil reclaiming
operation. The agreement provided that Waco would purchase
"petroleum products" supplied by Young.9 9 Waco sold some of the
waste either in its original state or in a partially diluted state to
Miller Oil Purchasing Company (Miller Oil).100 Miller Oil
contracted to sell Ashland Oil approximately 1,941 barrels of what
it thought was merchantable crude oil, which Miller Oil obtained
from Waco. 0 1 In actuality, the oil was contaminated with BR50
and BR68.1
02
Miller Oil pumped the hazardous substances into the crude oil
gathering lines of Ashland Pipeline, a local oil carrier. On April 18,
1971, Ashland's crude oil supply containing BR50 and BR68
entered its Catlettsburg, Kentucky refining tanks as a part of a
continuous flow of crude oil to the refinery.103 On April 19, 1971,
portions of the waste substances mixed with crude oil entered the
refinery stream causing a fire and explosion, which damaged the
refinery.104 Additionally, the injection of the hazardous substances
95. 678 F.2d at 1298. Apparently, the heat from the fire accelerated the chemical breakdown of
the substances and created, among other things, hydrochloric acid. Id.
96. Id. Although Young characterized himself as "one having been ... in the fringe areas of the
petrochemial industry," the court found that he was "not qualified, by education or experience, to
responsibly handle the disposal of the BR50 and BR68." Id. at 1299.
97. Id. at 1298-99.
98. Id. at 1299-1300. Rollins required Young to assure it that the hazardous wastes would not be
traced to their original source, the Rollins facility. Id. at 1299.
99. Id. at 1300-01. Young contracted with an independent hauling service to transport the waste
from the Rollins plant; apparently either the hauler or Waco's employees then pumped
approximately 2,016 barrels of the hazardous waste into Waco's two storage tanks. Id. at 1300.
100. Id. at 1301. Miller Oil tested its purchases from Waco to determine if the substance
purchased was oil and if so, to determine its quality. Consistent with the factual history of this case,
Miller Oil's terminal manager directed that the readings be falsified. Id. at 1301-02.
101. Id. at 1301-02. Although committed to selling Ashland only merchantable crude oil suit-
able for resale or processing. Miller Oil injected the hazardous substances into Ashland Pipeline's
network knowing that such substances would become part of the continuous flow of crude oil
destined for ultimate delivery to Ashland Oil's refinery in Kentucky. Id. at 1302.
102. Id. at 1302.
103. Id. at 1303.
104. Id.
NOTE
into the pipeline system caused the contamination of approximately
two million barrels of oil. 
105
The court in Ashland Oil considered sections 519 and 520 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 10 6 The court applied other factors
to the conduct of Rollins and Young that might be considered in
any examination of enterprise liability. 107 Applying these elements,
the court held that the disposal of the BR50 and BR68 by Rollins
and Young was an abnormally dangerous and ultrahazardous
activity. 08 The court explicitly recognized that those engaged in
this activity have created an inordinate risk for their own
benefit. 10 9 The court added that should the risk be realized and
injury sustained, it is immaterial that harm occurs through the
unexpected action of another party. 110 Therefore, Rollins was held
strictly liable even though it could not forsee that Miller would
purchase the waste materials from Waco as "crude oil" and
subsequently sell it to Ashland.I'
This latter principle appears particularly germane to situations
when independent haulers illegally dump an "innocent"
producer's hazardous wastes. Logically, the principle could be
extended to cases in which the third-party owners of dump sites are
financially unable to reimburse proper plaintiffs for damages.
B. OTHER CASES FINDING ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY
In Hutchinson v. Capeletti Brothers, Inc. 112 the Florida District
Court of Appeals addressed the imposition of strict liability for the
hazardous use of land. 113  Capeletti Brothers Construction
Company (Capeletti Brothers), in the process of building a bridge
for the Florida Department of Transportation, engaged in pile
driving work that damaged the residence of Hutchinson. 114 The
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1307-08. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §5 519, 520 (1977). For the text of
§ 519 and 520, see supra note 23.
107. 678 F.2d at 1307. The court stated that the following factors should be considered in
determining whether liability attaches to an activity: " 'The law and customs, a balancing of claims
and interests, a weighing of the risk and the gravity of harm, and a consideration of individual and
societal rights and obligations.' " Id. (quoting Langois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So.2d 133, 140
(La. 1971)).
108. 678 F.2d at 1308.
109. Id.
110. Id. The rule stated in § 522 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is that "one carrying on
an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict liability for the resulting harm although it is
caused by the unexpectable (a) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third person, or (b) action
ofan animal, or (c) operation of a force of nature." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977).
111. 678 F.2d at 1308.
112. 397 So. 2d952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
113. Hutchinson v. Capeletti Brothers, Inc., 397 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
114. Id-
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court found that Capeletti Brothers was not negligent in conducting
the work and that no suggestion of wanton or willful misconduct
existed. 15 The court acknowledged that in this situation a tribunal
must engage in a balancing process before liability for damage
caused by nonnegligent conduct may be shifted from the damaged
property owner to the nonnegligent actor.1 16 The balancing
approach adopted by the court consists of weighing the following
factors: (1) whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of
harm to the property of others; (2) whether the potential harm is
likely to be great; (3) whether the risk can be eliminated by the
exercise of reasonable care; (4) whether the activity is a matter of
common usage; (5) whether the activity is inappropriate to the
place where it is conducted; and (6) whether the activity has
substantial value to the community. 117 As a result of this balancing,
the court found that although the damage-causing activity had
substantial value to the community, it also carried a high degree of
risk of harm to the property of others." 8 For this reason the court
held that the risk of loss shifted to Capeletti Brothers as a cost of
doing business, which it may pass on to the ultimate user or insure
against. 119
In Green v. General Petroleum Corp. 120 the plaintiffs sought to
recover damages for injuries to their property caused by an oil well
blowout during the defendant's drilling operations. 121 The evidence
amply supported a finding that the defendant had exercised
ordinary care in drilling the well and, therefore, was not
negligent. 122 The court, however, held that a judgment for the
defendant was not justified simply because the defendant had
properly put down and cared for the well. 123 Rather, the court
found that absolute liability, regardless of any element of
negligence, existed when the damage was caused by the act or thing
115. Id. In cases involving wanton or willful misconduct, liability, if any is to be imposed, must
rest on some other rationale. Id.
116. Id. The court noted that the balancing process in which a court must engage when
imposing strict liability for a hazardous use of land "originally emanated from the treatment of this
subject in Tenative Draft No. 10 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Id.
117. Id. The relevant factors relied upon by the Hutchinson court are those found in § 520 of the
Restatement (Second) ofTorts. Id. (citing Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975)). For the text of § 520, see supra note 23.
118. 397 So. 2d at 953.
119. Id. at 953-54.
120. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
121. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 330, 270 P. 952, 953 (1928).
122. Id. at 331, 270 P. at 953. The court noted that the drilling crew was skilled and experienced
and used the best standard of equipment. Id. The court also noted that a careful study of the wells in
the vicinity indicated that the drillers would encounter no oil or gas for at least 200 feet below the
point where the blowout occurred. Id.
123. Id. at 333, 270 P. at 954. The court found that the case presented a "situation to which the
doctrine of 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas' [one must so use his own rights as not to infringe upon the
rights of another] may be applied in its broad and fundamental import." Id. at 333, 270 P. at 955.
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in question. 124 The court clearly indicated that the defendant well
drillers were responsible for controlling and confining whatever
force or power they uncovered. 125
In Environmental Protection Department v. Ventron Corp. 126 the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection brought suit
against several corporations and individuals based on mercury
pollution of a state waterway. 127 F.W. Berk & Company (Berk) was
the original owner and operator of a mercury processing plant from
1929 to 1960 on a forty-acre tract west of Berry's Creek.128 Velsicol
Corporation formed Wood Ridge Chemical Corporation (Wood
Ridge) as a wholly-owned subsidiary in 1960. Wood Ridge then
purchased Berk's assets, including the forty-acre tract containing
the mercury processing plant. 129 During the operation of the
mercury processing plant by Berk and Wood Ridge, mercury
drained into Berry's Creek causing the pollution. 130
The trial judge determined that Wood Ridge was guilty of
discharging mercury, a hazardous and toxic substance, into a state
waterway in violation of certain New Jersey environmental
statutes.131 Based on this determination the trial judge imposed
liability against Wood Ridge for abatement of a public nuisance as,
defined by statute as well as under the common law principle of
strict liability for unleashing a dangerous substance during a non-
natural use of land. 132 On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court
upheld this imposition of liability. 133
C. CASE LAW APPLICATION TO HAZARDOUS WASTE PRODUCERS
The above cases clearly aver that in the proper context liability
may be imposed regardless of fault. One proper context is engaging
124. Id. The court acknowledged that in the course of a lawful enterprise one may knowingly
engage in an act that may injure another. The court stated that if one then proceeds in the act and
injures another, no matter how carefully the act is carried out, the one who does the act should be
held liable for the injury. Id.
125. Id.
126. 182 NJ. Super. 210, 440 A.2d 455 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
127. Environmental Protection Dep't v. Ventron Corp., 182 NJ. Super. 210, 210, 440 A.2d
455, 455 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
128. Id. at 217, 440 A.2d at 458. In Ventron Berk was in default and did notjoin in the appeal. Id.
129. Id. From 1960 until 1974 the mercury processing plant was operated by Wood Ridge.
Wood Ridge merged with Ventron in 1974. At that time the plant was shut down. Id.
130. Id. at 217, 440 A.2d at 458-59. The trial judge concluded that "Berry's Creek . . . is
heavily polluted and a public nuisance through the 'vast cumulative effect' of mercury pollution."
Id.
131. Id. at 218, 440 A.2d at 459. The trial court found that Wood Ridge violated §§ 23:5-28 and
58:10-23.1 to. 10 of the NewJersey Statutes Annotated. Id. at 219, 440 A.2d at 459. Sections 58:10-
23.1 to .10 were subsequently repealed by the Spill Compensation and Control Act in 1977. 1976
N.J. LAws ch. 141,621.
132. 182 NJ. Super. at 219, 440 A.2d at 459.
133. Id.
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in abnormally dangerous activities. Courts will support the
imposition of liability for engaging in abnormally dangerous
activities on the added basis of enterprise liability. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines enterprise liability as the
liability imposed on one who enters into an activity for his own
benefit despite the fact that the activity creates very definite risks to
others. 134 Under the enterprise liability theory, a court may hold a
defendant liable even though the defendant does not conduct the
abnormally dangerous activity in a negligent manner.
Each defendant in these cases operated a business for profit
that involved some risk. While the court in Green did not specifically
find that the defendant was engaged in an abnormally dangerous
activity, the court nevertheless held that the defendant had
accepted the burden of controlling whatever risks it encountered. 135
The Ventron Corp. court, however, did not articulate an enterprise
liability theory. Rather the court held the defendant accountable
because he unleashed a dangerous substance during the non-
natural use of land. 13 6 The court in Hutchinson adopted the view that
pile driving work is an abnormally dangerous activity137 while the
Ashland Oil court categorically considered the defendant's activities
to be abnormally dangerous. 138 Both the Hutchinson and Ashland Oil
courts recognized the elements of enterprise liability. 139
An analysis of the four cases reveals that courts are willing to
vindicate harms caused by abnormally dangerous practices. In so
doing, courts will consider factors bearing on the nature of the
activity in question to decide whether the activity is abnormally
dangerous. Courts also will place emphasis, either express or
implied, on the enterprise liability theory to support any decision
determining that an activity is abnormally dangerous. Courts
logically could apply this analysis to hazardous waste litigation.
A generator creates hazardous wastes as part of a profit
enterprise. For this reason a generator should be held responsible
for any resulting damage. For several reasons this principle should
apply regardless of who controls the wastes when they leave the
generator's place of business. First, the generator is engaged in an
activity for his own purposes that creates an inordinate risk. 140
Second, any additional cost may be viewed as a cost of doing
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 comment d (1977).
135. Green, 205 Cal. at 334, 270 P. at 955.
136. Ventron, 182 N.J. Super. at 219, 440 A.2d at 459.
137. Hutchinson, 397 So. 2d at 953.
138. Ashland Oil, 678 F.2d at 1308.
139. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 397 So. 2d at 953; 678 F.2d at 1308.
140. Ashland Oil, 678 F.2d at 1308.
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business, which the producer may pass on to the ultimate user or
insure against. 141 Third, the generator is primarily responsible for
unleashing a hazardous substance during a nonnatural use of
land. 142 A brief consideration of the analogous area of products
liability and statutory reinforcement supports this result.
IV. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR GENERATOR STRICT
LIABILITY
A. THE ANALOGY TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The concept of strict liability regardless of negligence, as
developed in products liability law, is helpful in understanding why
liability should be imposed on hazardous waste generators
conducting abnormally dangerous activities. In Herbstman v.
Eastman Kodak Co. 143 the New Jersey Supreme Court found that
when a manufacturer presents goods to the public for sale, he
represents that the goods are suitable for their intended use.
144
Therefore, the court held that to invoke the theory of strict liability
in tort, a plaintiff must show that the product was defective when
placed in the stream of commerce. 
1 4 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court decided City of Bridgeton v.
B.P. Oil, Inc. 146 the following year. In Bridgeton the city brought an
action against the owner and the lessee of property where an oil
spill had occurred. The city sought the recovery of expenses
incurred in preventing the spread of the spill.1
4 7
The Bridgeton court noted that it had applied the concept of
strict liability regardless of negligence in Herbstman, but that the
concept as yet had not been extended to cases dealing with the
storage of ultrahazardous substances.1 4 8 The court pointed out that
the varying standard of care required in negligence cases depends
on the degree of danger involved in the activity. 149 The court found
141. Hutchinson, 397 So. 2d at 953-54.
142. "Ventron, 182 N.J. Super. at 219, 440 a.2d at 459.
143. 68 NJ. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975). In Herbstman a purchaser of a camera brought an action
against the manufacturer alleging a breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and of
reasonable fitness for the purposes for which it was to be used. Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
68 N.J. 1, 4, 342 A.2d 181, 184 (1975). The court held that the plaintiff could not recover under the
Uniform Commercial Code warranty of merchantability because the defect did not exist at the time
of sale. 68 N.J. at 1, 342 A.2d at 181. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to show the cost of repair of
the camera or the effect of the defect on its value. Id. Finally the court denied recovery because the
action was brought against the manufacturer rather than the intermediate seller, who was not the
maulacturer's servant, agent or employee. Id.
144. Id. at 7,342 A.2d at 184.
145. Id.
146. 146 NJ. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
147. City ofBridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 146 NJ. Super. 169, 171, 369 A.2d 49, 53 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1976).
148. Id. at 177, 369 A.2d at 53.
149. Id.
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that because storing oil in quantity creates a substantial risk, a
concomitant high standard of care exists. 150 The court also noted
that coupling this common law criterion with standards of care
imposed by statute required that the defendant exercise an
extremely high degree of care. 151 The court found that storing
ultrahazardous or pollutant substances was sufficient to warrant the
extension of strict liability to this area of ultrahazardous activity. 152
In a more recent New Jersey case, 5 3 the State Department of
Transportation brought a suit against PSC Resources,
Incorporated (PSC) for damages arising out of the alleged pollution
of a lake. 154 The court found that the rationale for imposing strict
liability in a defective product action was applicable. 5 5 The court
noted that New Jersey fully embraced the strict enterprise liability
theory as well as the policy of societal risk spreading. 56 Therefore,
the court held that PSC was liable for the damage resulting from
the discharge of pollutants onto the plaintiffs property. 157
The nature of hazardous waste products, which are
"defective" in the sense that they are inherently dangerous when
produced, warrants the extension of strict liability to this area of
endeavor.
B. STATUTORY AUTHORITY REINFORCING THE STRICT LIABILITY
THEORY
The emerging public policy of respect for the environment and
regard for human health is embodied in state as well as federal
law.' 58 One state statute broadly prohibits placing any hazardous
substance where it may run into the waters of the state. 159 Although
seemingly directed at the active wrong-doer, this statute is arguably
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 177, 369 A.2d at 53-54. The court noted that strict liability has been applied to
products liability cases. Id. at 177, 369 A.2d at 53. The court further explained its conclusion that
strict liability existed by acknowledging the impact of pollution upon the environment and the
statutory prohibition against pollution. Therefore, the court held that the concept of strict liability
extended to those who store ultrahazardous or pollutant substances. Id. at 177, 369 A.2d at 54.
153. NewJersey Dep't ofTransp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
154. Id. PSO purchased the assets of another corporation for cash. The court held PSC liable for
damages caused by the environmental torts of its predecessor. Id. at 467, 419 A.2d at 1162.
155. Id. at 466, 419 A.2d at 1161. The court noted: "The refinery is in a better position to
protect itself and bear the costs of a discharge of pollutants from its facility into bodies of water than
would be the public. In addition, the refiner is the instrumentality to look to for improvement of the
waste disposal process." Id.
156. Id. at 467, 419 A.2d at 1162.
157. Id. at 469, 419 A.2d at 1164.
158. See F. SKILLaRN, supra note 6, at 266-99.
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:5-28 (1940 & Supp. 1983). The statute states in part:
No person shall put or place into, turn into, drain into, or place where it can run, flow,
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applicable to the negligent entrustor. 16
0
An even broader source of possible waste generator liability is
the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act. 161 This Act
imposes strict liability for all clean-up and removal costs on any
person who discharges a hazardous substance into the waters of the
state.1 62 Liability extends to any person who is in any way
responsible for the discharge of a hazardous substance. 163 When
read with its broad definition of "discharge," the Act evidences a
clear legislative intent to effectively curtail irresponsible hazardous
waste disposal practices. 164
Minnesota recently enacted the Waste Management Act of
1980.165 This Act requires improved hazardous waste management
planning and development. 166 The Act is apparently a direct
wash or be emptied into, or where it can find its way into any of the fresh or tidal
waters within the jurisdiction of this State any petroleum products, debris, hazardous,
deleterious, destructive or poisonous substances of any kind....
Id.
160. See State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1973), aff'd, 133 N.J. Super. 375 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 69 N.J. 102, 351
A.2d 337 (1976). In jersey Cent. Power the court quotes part of a statement made at a public hearing by
Senator Apy on behalf of Senator Beadleston, the sponsor of S 23:5-28. Senator Apy stated that "the
object of the legislation is to say that anyone who permits [the introduction of] any injurious
substances which have effects that are detrimental to the inhabitants of the waterways shall be
responsible for doing it." 125 N.J. Super. at 100-01.
161. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (1982 & Supp. 1983). The purpose of the act is expressed as
follows: "[Pirohibiting the discharge of petroleum and other hazardous substances, providing for the
cleanup and removal of any such discharge, establishing a spill compensation fund, providing for the
raising of revenues therefor, all in order to protect the economy and environment of this State ......
1976 N.J. LAws ch. 141,621 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 58:10-23.11 (1982 & Supp. 1983)).
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 g (c). The subsection states:
Any person who has discharged a hazardous substance or is in any way
responsible for any hazardous substance which the [Department of Environmental
Protection] has removed or is removing pursuant to ... this act shall be strictly liable,
jointly and severally, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs.
Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 lb(h). The statute states:
"Discharge" means any intentional or unintentional action or omission resulting
in the releasing, spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping
of hazardous substance into the waters of the State or onto lands from which it might
flow or drain into said waters, or into waters outside thejurisdiction of the State when
damage may result to the lands, waters or natural resources within the jurisdiction of
the State....
Id.
165. MINN. STAT. ANN. 5§ 115A.01 to .72 (West Supp. 1983).
166. Id. § 115A.02. Section 115A.02 states:
It is the goal of sections 115A.01 to 115A.72 to improve waste management in the
state to serve the following purposes:
(a) Reduction in waste generated;
(b) Separation and recovery of materials and energy from waste;
(c) Reduction in indiscriminate dependence on disposal of waste;
(d) Coordination of solid waste management among political subdivisions;
(e) Orderly and deliberate development and financial security of waste facilities
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response to the growing hazardous waste problem.167 One duty of
the waste management board created under the Act 168 is to oversee
the search for hazardous waste disposal sites within the state. 169
According to the results of questionnaires distributed by the board
during public meetings in late 1980 and early 1981, a major
consideration in the choice of any site is protection of
groundwater. 1
70
North Dakota also enacted into law a chapter of the North
Dakota Century Code dealing with hazardous waste
management. 171 This chapter creates a regulatory program 172
which provides that a citizen may institute suit or intervene to
compel compliance with the statute. 173
These statutes reflect growing concerns with the general
quality of life and the specific problem of hazardous wastes. 174
including disposal facilities.
Id.
167. Grand Forks Herald, Sept. 19, 1982, at DI, col. 1. The article states that Minnesota
produces about 150,000 tons of hazardous wastes yearly. Approximately 16 percent of the wastes are
shipped to out of state disposal sites. The remaining wastes are unaccounted for. Officials believe
that more than half of this waste is dumped illegally. The 1980 legislature passed the Minnesota
Waste Management Act in an attempt to manage the waste situation. Id.
168. MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 115A.04 (West Supp. 1983).
169. Id. § 1 15A.05(4). This section states in part:
The board may direct the commissioner of administration to acquire by purchase,
lease, condemnation, gift, or grant, any permanent or temporary right, title, and
interest in and to real property, including positive and negative easements and water,
air, and development rights, for sites and buffer areas surrounding sites for hazardous
waste facilities approved by the board pursuant to sections 115A.18 to 115A.30 and
115A.32 to 115A.39....
Id.
170. Grand Forks Herald, Sept. 19, 1982, at DI, col. 2. The Herald reported that "[n]inety-
three percent of the participant groups named groundwater protection as a major consideration and
said the facility should be placed in highly impermeable soil." Id.
171. See N.D. CENT. CODE §5 23-20.3-01 to -10 (Supp. 1981 & Interim Supp. 1983).
172. Id. § 23-20.3-01. Section 23-20.3-01 states the following purposes of the chapter: (1) the
protection of human health and the environment; (2) the establishment of a program to totally
regulate hazardous waste; (3) the promotion of reduction of hazardous waste generation and reuse,
recovery, and treatment as preferred alternatives to landfill disposal; and (4) the safe and adequate
management of hazardous waste disposal sites within the state. Id.
173. Id. § 23-20.3-09(5)(a). This section states that "[a]ny person having an interest which is or
may be adversely affected by a violation of this chapter may commence a civil action on his own
behalf to compel compliance with this chapter, or any regulation, order, or permit issued pursuant to
this chapter." Id. Section 32-40-06, however, states that "any person ... aggrieved by the violation
of any environmental statute, rule, or regulation of this state may bring an action . . . either to
enforce such statute, rule, or regulation, or to recover any damages that have occurred as a result of the
violation, or for both such enforcement and damages." N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-40-06 (1976) (emphasis
added). Section 32-40-06 appears to preserve in the citizenry the common law right to sue on
grounds of strict liability for engaging in abnormally dangerous activities. See United Plainsmen v.
North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). United Plainsmenis
the only case to date that discusses chapter 32-40. The court in United Plainsmen stated, "We think
the Public Trust Doctrine requires, as a minimum, evidence of some planning by appropriate state
agencies and officers in the allocation of public water resources, and that the Environmental Law
Enforcement Act (Chapter 32-40, NDCC) requires more than a plenary dismissal of the action." Id.
at 463.
174. Most states have enacted hazardous waste management legislation. See ALA. CODE 55 22
-30-1 to -24 (Supp. 1982); ALAsKA STAT. 55 46.03.250 to .311 (1982); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 55 36
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These statutes are a signal that the problem at long last has been
recognized. The courts should interpret these statutes to reflect a
policy of law that firmly deals with those who trade in hazardous
wastes. To aid in the implementation of this policy, the courts
should not hesitate to apply their previous interpretations under the




This Note demonstrates that no single legal theory or
formulation exists to charge the generators of hazardous wastes
with strict liability for their actions. Yet as United States Supreme
Court Justice Holmes said, "The life of the law has not been logic:
it has been experience.' '176 Experience and cases such as Ashland Oil
have shown that reliance cannot be placed solely upon legislation
such as the RCRA to assure that society is protected from the
effects of mishandled hazardous wastes. Principles of enterprise
liability and the concept of strict liability for those who engage in
ultrahazardous activities, however, can achieve the desired result.
The unduly dangerous activity rule of Rylands v. Fletcher
survives today. The rule is incorporated into section 520 of the
-2801 to -2806 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §5 82-4201 to -4224 (Supp. 1981); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 25245 to 25249 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-20-101 to -116 (1973 &
Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §? 22a-416 to -471 (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,
§§ 6301 to 6317 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.72 to .729 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 43-2901 to -2914a (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4401 to -4422 (Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 111 Y, §§ 1001 to 1007.1 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1983); IND. CODEANN. §§ 13-7-8.5-1
to -8 (Burns 1981 & Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.411 to .455 (West Supp. 1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.2201 to .265 (Supp. 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30.1131 to .1149.1
(West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1301 to 1319-K (1978 & Supp. 1982); MD.
HEALTH-ENVTL CODE ANN. §§ 7-201 to -268 (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21C, §§ I to 14; ch. 21D,
§§ 1 to 19 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1981); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 299.501 to .551 (Supp. 1983);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115A.01 to .72 (West Supp. 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-1 to-135 (Supp.
1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 260.350 to .430 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-401 to
-421 (1982); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1521.01 to .07 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 444.700 to .778
(1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-A:1 to -D:6 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-1 to
-116; §§ 58:10-23.11 to .19 (West 1952 & Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4-1 to -12 (1981);
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0701 to -1319 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143
-215.75 to .94 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-20.3-01 to -10 (Supp. 1981 & Interim Supp. 1983);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.01 to .99 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1
-2001 to -2021 (West Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 459.410 to .690 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 6018.401 to .405 (Purdon Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19.1-1 to -22 (1979 & Supp. 1982);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-10 to -200 (Law Co-op Supp. 1982); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 32-9-48 to
39-9-52 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-6301 to -6317 (Supp. 1982); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§§ 26.261 to .307 (Vernon Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-14-1 to -18 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6601 to 6613 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-278.1 to .7 (1982 & Supp. 1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.105.010 to .140 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-26-1 to -25 (1979 &
Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.60 to .74 (West Supp. 1982).
175. For a discussion of the reasons for extending strict liability to storage of ultrahazardous
substances, see supra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
176. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Justice Holmes said that "[t]he felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have had a good deal
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed." Id.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognizes the
inappropriateness of an activity to the place where it is conducted as
one of the factors in determining whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous. 177 Section 520 also lists the following as other factors
considered in determining whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous: Existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others; likelihood that the harm that
results from the activity will be great; inability to eliminate the risk
by the exercise of reasonable care; extent to which the activity is not
a matter of common usage; and extent to which the activity's value
to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 178
Many of these factors apply to the problem of hazardous waste
liability.
The disposal of common and ordinary waste products or the
operation of a landfill is not an unnatural use of land. Conversely,
depositing hazardous materials, which may eventually cause health
problems, on an ordinary parcel of land may be an unnatural use of
the land. When considered in connection with the enterprise
liability theory - risk-producing businesses should bear the costs
of those risks - the party responsible for any damage caused by the
hazardous waste is, logically, the producer of the waste.
Furthermore, the history of products liability law and the
proliferation of state environmental protection statutes add
substance to the argument that public policy is moving towards
stricter control and greater accountability of hazardous waste
generators.
Considering the tremendous harm that may result from a
hazardous substance, even if legally disposed of, the time has come
to charge enterprises involved in activities creating abnormally
dangerous risks with responsibility for their actions. 
179
STANLEY EDWARD TRACEY
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF IORTS § 520(e).
178. See id. at § 520(a)-(d), ().
179. The Bridgeton court perhaps stated the responsibility concept best:
The developing stream of legal thought flows without difficulty and inexorably in the
direction of such liability. As a society we are constantly made aware of the
diminishing quantity and quality of our environment. Save, hopefully, in its ideals this
is no longer the land of our fathers with its limitless bounty from sea to sea. This
generation of Americans has seen its bounty wasted by mindless and reckless misuse.
It has further seen the almost unchecked development of products whose misuse or
improper employment leads to disfigurement and death. The law is not - or ought
not be - so feeble as to exonerate those whose conduct causes harm to others by
reason ofsuch use or abuse. I
City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 177-78, 369 A.2d 49, 54 (Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1976).
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